March 28, 2012

VIA FAX (202) 482-0800
Freedom of Information Act Request
Freedom of Information Officer
Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and Security, Room 6622
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, DC 20230

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request and Request for Expedited
Processing

Dear FOIA Officer:

This letter constitutes a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and is submitted on behalf of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). As detailed below, EPIC seeks agency records concerning the export of surveillance technology by U.S. firms.

Factual Background

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) is a public interest research center located in Washington, D.C. EPIC focuses on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues. EPIC has a demonstrated interest in international privacy issues and has written to the Department of Commerce in the past concerning the export of surveillance technology to China.1

BIS is responsible for implementing and enforcing the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).2 The EAR covers “dual use” commodities, software, and technology that have both military and commercial applications.3 The EAR also contains the Commerce Control List (“CCL”)4 and the Commerce Country Chart.5 If the reason for control of a commodity, software, or technology listed on the CCL applies to a country on the Commerce Country Chart, a license is required unless there is an

1 See generally EPIC AND PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS (2006).
2 See Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC, to Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, Department of Commerce, (Sept. 20, 2006), https://epic.org/privacy/intl/doc_china_letter.pdf (urging the reexamination of export policies that “prohibit[] the export of traditional security devices while permitting the sale of products that make possible far more widespread surveillance and political control.”).
4 See 15 C.F.R. ch. VII, subch. C.
exception available. Items not appearing on the CCL are subject to the catch-all “EAR99” designation, under which a license is required if the item is bound for an embargoed nation or the item will be used for prohibited end-uses or by prohibited end-users. Export regulations also require a license for the export of “items that may be used for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. . . .” Finally, the Department of Commerce is also responsible for launching investigations into violations of these licensing restrictions.

Apart from domestic export regulations, the United States is also a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a voluntary arrangement through which states attempt to “ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.” The arrangement requires exporters to submit reports for the export of items covered under the arrangement.

Recently, reports have indicated that Syrian officials used devices manufactured by U.S. companies to monitor Internet usage in the country in October, 2011. These devices, made by Blue Coat Systems (“Blue Coat”) of Sunnyvale, California, have the functionality to monitor network traffic and block websites. Blue Coat initially denied that they sold products to Syria, but admitted that the devices could have made their way to Syria through third parties. Furthermore, these devices were “transmitting automatic status messages back to [Blue Coat] as [they] censored the Syrian Web.”

On November 9, 2011, during a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman said that “The Department of Commerce is looking into . . . this very specific case because there was no license issue[d] to send this stuff to Syria. . . . [A]ny such item like this that would be exported to Syria, requires on a case by case examination and an export license. . . . [T]he

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12 See 15 C.F.R. § 743(b) (2012).
14 Id.
15 Id.
Department of Commerce is investigating it.”\textsuperscript{17} Several U.S. Senators responded by sending a letter to the Secretaries of the Department of State and the Department of Commerce requesting that they

“investigate and report to us on the following issues: 1) whether the reports of [Blue Coat’s] involvement in providing technology to the Syrian government is [sic] accurate; 2) if these reports are accurate, whether such equipment has been used to carry out human rights abuses; and 3) whether [Blue Coat’s] sales are in violation of U.S. export law.”\textsuperscript{18}

On November 17, 2011, the Washington Post reported that the Department of Commerce had launched an investigation into how the Syrian regime both owned and used surveillance equipment manufactured by Blue Coat.\textsuperscript{19} The article stated that “[c]ommerce officials are attempting to determine whether [Blue Coat] had prior knowledge that its equipment and software was being used by the Syrian government, according to several U.S. officials.”\textsuperscript{20} On December 16, 2011, BIS determined that two third-party individuals that Blue Coat had sold devices to “act[ed] contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States” in selling these Blue Coat devices to Syria and added them to the Entity List, limiting their ability to trade with U.S. companies.\textsuperscript{21}

Blue Coat is not the only company selling technology that will enable repressive regimes to monitor and control their population’s Internet usage. Syrian officials contracted with an Italian company to build a system “with the power to intercept, scan and catalog virtually every e-mail that flows through the country” using storage hardware and software from California-based NetApp,\textsuperscript{22} a move criticized by Senators Kirk, Casey,
and Coons. McAfee has provided “content-filtering software used by Internet-service providers in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait” and Websense, Inc. sold its Web-filtering technology in Yemen.

Documents Requested

EPIC requests copies of the following agency records in possession of the Department of Commerce:


2. Any agency records concerning reports filed by U.S. exporters regarding technology used or marketed for surveillance purposes under the Wassenaar Arrangement and 15 C.F.R. § 743(b) from March 19, 2010-March 19, 2012.

3. Any agency records concerning licenses obtained or requested by U.S. exporters for dual-use technology used or marketed for surveillance purposes under the EAR from March 19, 2010-March 19, 2012.

Request for Expedited Processing

This request warrants expedited processing because it is made by “a person primarily engaged in disseminating information …” and it pertains to a matter about which there is an “urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged federal government activity.”

EPIC is “primarily engaged in disseminating information.”

There is a particular urgency for the public to obtain information about the export of surveillance technology by U.S. firms to repressive regimes. These activities have been the subject of numerous reports by the national media, requests for information by

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23 See Kirk, Casey, & Coons supra note 18.
members of Congress, and even federal lawsuits. Many of the firms in question also sell their products and services in the United States. There is uncertainty over whether current legal regimes are able to hold these firms accountable. Thus, one of the only remaining accountability options is consumer spending patterns, a mechanism which requires that consumers possess sufficient information about the firms’ business activities.

Request for “News Media” Fee Status

EPIC is a “representative of the news media” for fee waiver purposes. Based on our status as a “news media” requester, we are entitled to receive the requested record with only duplication fees assessed. Further, because disclosure of this information will “contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government,” any duplication fees should be waived.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. As provided in 6 C.F.R. § 5.5(d)(4), I will anticipate your determination on our request for expedited processing within ten (10) calendar days.

Respectfully Submitted,

Ginger McCall
Director, EPIC Open Government Program

David Jacobs
EPIC Consumer Protection Fellow

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28 See Kirk, Casey, & Coonz supra note 18.
